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Ectopic Pregnancy 
and Methotrexate 
by 
Father Jack Healy 
The author is a member of the Carmelite fathers, Rochester, NY. 
The moral issue posed by ectopic pregnancy and surgical intervention is not new. 
However, with the advent of chemotherapy and specifically the compound 
methotrexate (mtx) a new moral situation has arisen. 
As is well known, appeal to the principle of double effect permitted the surgical 
removal of that portion of the fallopian tube threatened by the presence of an 
attached fetus. The principle of double effect acknowledged the moral reality 1) that 
the act, in this case the surgical removal of the threatened portion, was not evil in 
itself, 2) that the double effect was simultaneous, that is, the preservation of the 
mother's health was not the result of the fetus' death, 3) that a grave situation existed 
and 4) that the evil effect, in this case, the fetus' death, was not intended or willed. 
While morally licit in terms of double effect, the medical procedure carried foreseen 
and unfortunate consequences for both the baby and the mother's fertility. 
However, with the introduction of mtx, although both invasive surgery and the 
compromising of female fertility are now obviated, the child's death as an evil effect 
still remains. In view of its medical advantages, chemotherapy seems preferable to 
surgery and at first glance may seem to substitute for it in the application of double 
effect. Thus, chemotherapy appears to maintain the same moralliceity as surgery. 
But does it in the case of mtx? 
Mtx is a chemical used to prevent DNA replication and cellular division. 
Powerful in its control of tumors, its effect on the rapid cell division of embryos is 
lethal. Thus, mtx is ipso facto fetal-toxic. With knowledge of this fact, a physician in 
the case of an ectopic pregnancy could not without moral contradiction intend the 
administration of the drug but not its effect. His situation is not unlike that of a 
physician who relieves his patient's pain by administering a lethal injection. Neither 
physician can disclaim an intention to kill despite his motivation to provide medical 
relief. Direct killing is the act willed and executed by the physicians irrespective of 
the recipients of the relief. 
Relative to the principle of double effect and its application to ectopic pregnancy, 
the chemotherapeutic use of mtx is morally illicit, for its object is unmistakably 
feticide. Moreover, this act, while securing by way of consequence the mother's 
well-being, is also its cause. In this respect too, the act violates the principle of double 
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effect. For in requiring that the good and evil effects occur simultaneously, the 
principle eschews as morally untenable the cause-effect sequence which would 
permit the doing of evil to achieve goo:l. Yet that ~ prerisely what takes place when through 
the use of mtx the direct killing of the baby secures the mother's health and fertility. 
This is a salient point for those inclined to adopt consequentialist reasoning. With 
its pragmatic calculus, such reasoning will, of course, rightly call attention to the fact 
that the surgical procedure permitted by the principle of double effect eventuates in 
both the compromised fertility of the mother and the death of the embryo. Mtx 
chemotherapy, at least, preserves the mother's fertility. How then, relative to 
medical consequences, can a physician not prefer mtx to surgery especially when in 
the case of the latter the baby's death is inevitable anyway? 
To one schooled in a practical science like medicine, consequentialist thinking is 
as alluring as the chemotherapy it justifies. Within its benefit-burden calculations, 
consequentialism can also cite in the use of mtx the risk-reduction of tubal rupture 
and hemorrhaging prior to surgery and of the possible attendant problems following 
it. Yet, despite its pragmatic appeal, consequentialism is inadequate to the moral 
situation confronting the doctor. For in recognizing the salutary effects of mtx for 
the mother, consequentialism makes the medical benefits of mtx the moral gauge by 
which to judge the intention and action of the physician administering the drug. 
With the benefits so obvious, consequentialism, a fortiori, judges mtx 
chemotherapy morally permissible. 
In sanctioning the use of mtx, consequentialist reasoning confuses the physical 
and moral orders. Moreover, it reveals the two crucial flaws of consequentialist 
reasoning: its denial of intrinsically evil acts and its facile distinction between moral 
goods/evils and non-moral (pre-moral) goods/evils. With reference to the latter 
distinction, consequentialism holds that the death of the fetus through surgery is an 
example of a physical non-moral evil because it lies outside the deliberate intention 
of the surgeon. Obviously, the principle of double effect can accomodate this view. 
But the matter is otherwise when consequentialism allows under certain 
circumstances the wilful and deliberate execution of the evil itself in the interest of 
an overriding good or value. In the case at hand, sparing the mother invasive surgery 
and partial sterilization are such goods. 
The use of mtx to attain these values brings to light the more fundamental flaw of 
consequentialism, namely, its denial of intrinsically evil acts. John Paul's encyclical 
Veritatis Splendor has been most emphatic on this point, recalling the Church's 
received tradition that certain acts irrespective of their motive and circumstances are 
by nature always evil "semper et pro semper" (52). As objects of man's choice, they 
violate the very dynamism of his will toward the good. They thereby determine his 
moral character, "his profOUnd spiritual traits" (par. 71) and make the individual 
performing them evil (ibidem). So it is with the physician who resorts to the direct 
killing of the innocent unborn. 
From a medical point of view, the difference may seem unimportant that in his 
surgery on the fallopian tube one physician permits fetal death while another 
directly wills and causes it in the use of mtx chemotherapy. But from the moral point 
of view, the difference in intention and in action is immense. It is the difference 
between saving life and taking life. 
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